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IN LOCO PARENTIS IN TOE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: ABU·S ED,
CONFUSED,
. IN NEED OF C
. GE
Susan Stuart*
[T]o kill an error is as good a service as, and sometimes even better than,
the establishing a new truth or fact.

-Charles Darwin

1

In loco parentis is a common law doctrine that has been used to
characterize the on-campus relationship between a school and its
students, but its abuse has led to such absurd cases as Safford Unified
School District No.1 v. Redding. Although. waning in higher education,
the doctrine is experiencing a resurgence in elementary and secondary
schools. As originally conceived, the doctrine was used primarily to
justify and defend student disciplinary actions: the school stood in the
shoes of the parent and had authority to discipline, almost .a t will. The
doctrine, however, never seemed to have a corollary in the schools'
responsibility for students' safety. Now, in loco parentis is being
reenergized to excuse violating student rights, particularly with
degrading treatment in matters of search and seizure, but with little or
no concomitant recognition of any responsibility to protect students
from equally degrading treatment occasioned by sexual harassment and
bullying. This Article discusses why this doctrine is being revived and
why that revival is misguided. Part of the blame lies with courts' and
schools' in.a bility to articulate some other, more modern justification for
school disciplinary policies. A larger portion of the blame, however,
lies both with a careless political process that is tasking schools with
more than just an educational function and with an equally careless
judiciary that believes in loco parentis means Hit's none of our
business. "
Instead, education professionals can and should be
exploring an institutional model of their relationship with students in
both the treatment of and duties toward their civil rights.

*

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School ofLaw. Many thanks to the participants at
the Summer 2009 Oxford Roundtable where this thesis was first presented; to Bill Horvath, my. trusty.
research assistant; and to Ivan Bodensteiner for his ability to get me to focus.
1. 2 CHARLES DARWIN, MORE LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN 422 (Francis Darwin & A. C.
Seward eds. 1903) (Letter 752 to A. Stephen Wilson, March 5, 1879).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the evolution of law, perhaps one of the greatest anomalies is the
continuing vitality of the doctrine of in loco parentis in education law.
Meaning "in the place of a parent," the doctrine would ordinarily be
understood to require the guardianship qualities of a parent, as being
supportive, protective, and perhaps disciplinary. When the doctrine is
applied in public schools, most courts have focused almost solely on the
disciplinary aspect of the principle without considering its concomitant
protective responsibilities. At some point during the late twentieth
century, courts began to revisit the viability of in loco parentis in the
modem, state-run institutions of present-day public schools and turned
to a more realistic legal analysis of the school-child relationship.
Lately, however, in loco parentis has experienced an inexplicable
resurgence that seems designed primarily to protect school districts from
the responsibility for unwise and otherwise indefensible search and
seizure policies disguised as disciplinary decisions.
There may be several reasons for this trend, not the least of which is
2
the authoritarian tendencies of the current U.S. Supreme Court, which
might side with the unquestioned authority of school boards and
administrators to manage their school districts. This unfortunate state of
affairs is multifaceted, but this Article demonstrates the unsuitability of
in loco parentis as a legal doctrine in schools, first, because it was never
properly implemented by the courts in the United States and, second,
because its continued existence is no longer appropriate to the modem
3
needs of public education.
When courts first started using in loco parentis as a justification
defense for schools, they used it as a descriptive word of convenience
because they never really adopted the entirety of the doctrine. From its
origins in U.S. public education law, the common law doctrine of in loco
parentis was applied almost exclusively to student discipline. Rarely
was it understood to also apply to parental-like responsibilities for the
care of students. Consequently, in loco parentis was a misnomer for
something other than the doctrine was intended and was applied in other
arenas, such as higher education.
2. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 434 47
( 1991 ); Susan Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through
Pseudocommunication, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1545, 1552-57 (2008).
3. This Article's scope does not develop a thorough examination of an obligation of public
schools to provide support and protection to students the flip-side to the disciplinary use of in loco
parentis. That topic will be addressed in a later article related to the increasing intrusiveness of student
searches. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (middle school
student improperly strip-searched for prescription·strength ibuprofen).
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Second, even if properly adopted, in loco parentis was never designed
to be or understood as a concept that would apply to the system of staterun schools in the United States. In loco parentis assumes a voluntary
delegation of parental authority and was envisioned during a time of
either home-schooling tutors or small residential, private schools. The
doctrine is now anachronistic in an era of involuntary delegation
occasioned by compulsory attendance laws and of large public schools
with responsibilities that often go beyond educational function. As a
consequence, courts started to drift away from in loco parentis, and it
may well have died a natural death, especially with the decisions in
4
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and New
5
Jersey v. TL.0.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court intervened and
halted at least temporarily what would ordinarily be a quiet, natural,
and uneventful death of a species that deserved to be extinct.
A body of legal scholarship discourses on various evolutionary
6
theories about the law. "Today the idea that law 'evolves' is so deeply
ingrained in Anglo-American legal thought that most lawyers are no
7
longer even conscious of it as a metaphor." A burgeoning field of
study posits that the formation of law is evolutionary in and of itself and
that there is fruitful inquiry into this field as a construct of cultural
8
evolution: "[B]ehavioral research with genetic implications~"
Most
pertinent here is perhaps Holmes's "doctrinal" approach to evolution in
9
the law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be

u.s.
u.s.

4. 393
503 ( 1969).
5. 469
325 ( 1985).
6. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319
(2008); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985);
M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 31 (1993); see also
Jan Vetter, The Evolution ofHolmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 343 (1984).
7. Elliott, supra note 6, at 38.
8. E. Adamson Hoebel, Anthropology, Law and Genetic Inheritance, in LAW, BIOLOGY &
CULTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 27, 28 (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannon eds., 1983). Legal
anthropology as a research field has focused, in many respects, on those characteristics of the law that
one might find in any ordinary law review article: "the nature of norn1s, dispute handling processes,
sanctions, authority and levels of hierarchy within a social system to which any body of law may apply."
/d. at 31; see, e.g., John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Legal Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief
History of the Ethnographic Study of Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 41 (1993); Elliott, supra note 6, at 7190; Anne Griffiths, Law, Space, and Place: Re.framfng Comparative Law and Legal Anthropology, 34
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 495 (2009).
9. Elliott, supra note 6, at 50.
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governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what
it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We
must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But
the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two
.Into new prod ucts at every stage. 10

Although law is affected by judges' conscious choices as they make
11
and define the law, the law does evolve, even if that evolution is
12
merely a metaphor for the change that law experiences.
In this
context, in loco parentis was never adaptable to the common school
tradition of the United States, and consequently, it could not evolve.
And it should have been allowed to die years ago.
To support that thesis, this Article addresses both the history of and
the flaws in the in loco parentis doctrine in education law. First, this
Article examines both the historical origins and judicial reliance on the
in loco parentis doctrine, primarily in the United States. It then
addresses the inherent fallacy of relying on the doctrine, especially in
contemporary education law cases. Last, this Article explores the better
alternative professional education standards as being much better
measures of school districts' duties and responsibilities because they
provide better normative standards for courts to compare than the
loosely descriptive in loco parentis doctrine. Ultimately, this Article
expostulates that the in loco parentis doctrine should be put out of its
misery: if courts will not allow it to go the way of the dodo, then it will
have to be eradicated like the ubiquitous kudzu.
II. WHAT'S OLD Is NEW AGAIN
The report ofmy death was an exaggeration.
-Mark Twain

13

The origins of the in loco parentis doctrine are murky. It may go
back as far as the Code of Hatmnurabi through ancient Roman times to

10. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see also Elliott, supra note 6,
at SO.

11. Elliott, supra note 6, at 54.
12. !d. at 90. "We speak of the law 'adapting' to its social, cultura], and technological
environment without the slightest awareness of the jurisprudential tradition we are invoking." !d. at 38.
13. Mark Twain quotations- Death, http://www.twainquotes.com/Death.html (last visited Apr.
5, 2010).
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14

the present.
The Latinism, in loco parentis, translates as "in the place
15
of a parent.~'
It is not to be confused with parens patriae, which
16
means "parent of his or her country." While in loco parentis describes
the relationship of an individual who has the care and custody of
children in the place of the children's parents, the parental role ascribed
to parens patriae is undertaken by a govermnent to care for those who
17
cannot care for themselves, such as children and the infirn1.
An
individual may be the parent or in loco parentis to a child, but the state
can step in to protect the child from the parent if need be, like an tiber18
parent.
This situation reveals the inherent clash between the notion
that the state can be in loco parentis to schoolchildren yet still act as
parens patriae. This clash is like the fox guarding the chicken coop at
what point will the state police itself in its parens patriae role if it is
failing in its in loco parentis role?
This label of in loco parentis is still applied to any person or entity
19
standing in a guardian-type position in the place of a parent.
In that
circumstance, using the term presupposes that the guardian will act like
a parent in all respects. For some reason, however, this term has become
most closely identified with education law and has gained an unexpected
life of its own by meaning something other than its commonly
14. Alan F. Edwards, Jr., In Loco Parentis: Alive and Kicking. Dead and Buried, or Rising
2
(Educ.
Res.
Info.
Ctr
Doc.
#375720,
1994),
available
at
Phoenix?
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_Ol/0000019b/80/l3/64/1a.pdf.
15. Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead? 15 J.L. &
EDUC. 271, 271 {1986); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009). Black's Law Dictionary
provides the following definition: "Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a
child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent." /d. A person acting in loco parentis
"acts in place of a parent, either temporarily ... or indefinitely .. . has assumed the obligations of a
parent without forn1ally adopting the child." /d. at 1257 ("person in loco parentis,').

16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1221.
17. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 271 n.1; Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a
Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children's
Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381 (2000); Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The
State and the Parent/Child Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5 I, 51 (2007).
18. Scott A. Davidson, Note, When Is Parental Discipline Child Abuse? The Vagueness of Child
Abuse Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 403,406 (1996) ("Because of the child's natural dependency
on his or her parents, the state has a superior right to protect the child when that dependency threatens
the child's well-being.").
19. As of June, 2009, the following federal statutes use the tet n1inology in loco parentis: 5
U.S.C. § 6381 (2006 & Supp. II. 2008) (Family & Medical Leave Act); id. § 81 02a (Compensation for
Work Injuries); 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (Aliens & Nationality); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1477, 1482 (Anned
Forces); 18 U.S.C. §§ 115, 879, 1116 (Crimes & Criminal Procedure); 20 U.S.C. §§ 932, 1232h, 7801,
9402 (Education); 22 U.S.C. §§ 213, 2708 (Foreign Relations); 25 U.S.C. § 231 (Indians); 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611 (Labor); 33 U.S.C. § 902 (Navigation & Navigable Waters); 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 411f> 41th (Pay
& Allowances ofthe Unifonned Services); 38 U.S.C. § 1901 (Veterans' Benefits); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301,
1437d, 1437f, 2000c-6, 2000d, 2000e, 9858n (Public Health & Welfare). If one searches the online
legal retrieval systems, one finds there is nearly the same number of federal regulations using the term.
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understood definition.
William Blackstone's Commentaries is usually cited as the common
law source of the edict that schools stand in the shoes of the parent:
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge,
viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the
20
purposes for which he is employed.

Although Blackstone cited to no legal authority for this common law
21
proposition, contemporary researchers infer that his sources were
Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, and Mills, primarily for antecedents of a
22
father;s p.o wer to control his children:
Part of the parental task of raising children to be responsible adults
consists in making rules for them, and part of the task of making rules
includes the power to enforce those rules where necessary . . . . Others
are not allowed to take it upon themselves to discipline children, except in
those situations in which they occupy some other guardian-like role in
relation to those children, such as teachers, and even in those
23
.
circumstances the power is in loco parentis.

Note that even contemporary res.e archers are attributing only the
parental right of discipline to in loco parentis powers of teachers. But a
close and literal reading of Blackstone should highlight that he joined in
loco parentis with discipline; he did not extract discipline as the only
portion of in loco parentis that applied to the teacher nor did he divest
teachers of their overarching guardianship responsibilities, especially
given the historical context.
Nevertheless, this narrow interpretation of Blackstone's common law
persisted (and still ,p ersists) that Blackstone meant that teachers have
only disciplinary powers and such narrow interpretation profoundly
shaped the early legal doctrine as a defense of justification in school

20. 1
WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
*441,
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_centurylblackstone_bklch16.asp; see· William G. Buss, Procedural Due
Process for School Discipline~· Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 559 (1971);
Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco Parentis: A Lens for
Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17; 18-19 (2002); John C. Hogan &
Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentis in the United States 1765-1985, 8 J. LEGAL HISTORY 260, 260
(1987); Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and
Proposal for Refonn, 44 V AND. L. REV. 1135, 1144 ( 1991 ); Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 2 71.
21 ., BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *441; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2 71 n.4.
22. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20; at 260. The "core context" for in loco parentis is student
discipline, or "restraint and correction." Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 273.
23. Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 61, 85 n.36 (2008).
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discipline cases, particularly when corporal punishment was involved.
The doctrine "was readily imported from England as protection for
public school teachers who saw the need to corporally punish students in
the[i]r charge. This protection took the form of a broad, although not
25
unlimited, defense in criminal and civil suits for assault and battery."
26
In the 1837 case of State v. Pendergrass
deemed the earliest U.S.
case applying the in loco parentis principle the State of North Carolina
charged a schoolmistress with assault and b,a ttery for having applied a
27
switch to a seven-year-old female student.
Although not denoted by
its Latinism, the in loco parentis principle was the rationale for the
court's determination· that the schoolmistress's authority to impose
discipline in the form of corporal punishment derived from the
delegation of parental authority:
It is not easy to state with precision, the power which the law grants to
schoolmasters and teachers, with respect to the correction of their pupils.
It is analogous to that which belongs to parents; and the authority of the
teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental authority. One of the most
sacred duties of parents, is to train up and qualify their children, for
becoming useful and virtuous members of society; this duty cannot be
effectually performed without the ability to command obedience, to
control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits; and
to enable him to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed with the power
to administer moderate correction, when he shall believe it to be just and
necessary. The teacher is the substitute of the parent; is charged in part
with the performance of his duties, and in the exercise of these delegated
28
duties, is invested with his power.

The Pendergrass court clearly acknowledged a great discretion
bestowed upon teachers that was nearly parallel to a court's refusal to
29
interfere in the parent-child relationship.
24. See Buss, supra note 20, at 559-60.
25. Zirkel & Reichn.er, supra note 15, at 273.
26. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837).
27. /d.; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 262.
28. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. at 365-66. Th~ schoolmistress's conviction was overturned on ,appeal,
as a matter of law, because the injuries inflicted on the child were only temporary and the
schoolmistress's motivation was not activated by malice. /d. at 367-68. Note that the Pendergrass
opinion discussed affinnative tutelary duties in addition to the disciplinary power delegated to effectuate
a child's education. Later de,c isions ignored the affinnative tutelary duty in favor of emphasizing the
disciplinary power.
29. See also Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 273. An Alabama court "cited the [in loco
parentis] doctrine as clothing the teacher with the parent's delegated authority to discipline the pupil to
the same-extent that they cou1d do so themselves." /d. Also keep in mind that contemporary law did not
afford much protection for children. At about the same time the Pendergrass case was appealed so was
the case of Mary Conner. When Mary attempted to discipline her teenage son for failing to follow her
instructions, she threw a fire poker at him. Her teenage son evaded the poker, but it killed her five-year-
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For well over a century, cases applying in loco parentis ,as a legal
doctrine were confined nearly exclusively to corporal punishment cases~
One path of this application established that teachers had wide discretion
to punish students as a matter of law, constrained only if the students
30
sustained serious injuries.
That path is nearly extinct. The other path
of the doctrine regards teacher discretion ,as a question of fact whereby a
trier-of-fact could determine the reasonableness of the punishment; this
path survives today in those jurisdictions that still allow teachers to
31
administer corporal punishment.
This other path also signaled the
narrowing of a teacher's discretion, as Blackstone proposed, to the
purposes for which the teacher is employed, i.e., within the limits of the
32
teacher's responsibility and jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court summarized the "modern'' view of in loco
parentis in 1977:
At common law a single principle has governed the use of corporal
punishment since before the American Revolution: Teachers may impose
reasonable but not excessive force to discipline a child. Blackstone
catalogued among the "absolute rights of individuals" the right ''to
security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and
wounding," but he did not regard it a '" corporal insult'' for a teacher to
inflict "moderate correction'' on a child in his care. To the extent that
force was "necessary to answer the purposes for which (the teacher) is
employed," Blackstone viewed it as 'Justifiable or lawful." The basic.
doctrine has not changed. The prevalent rule in this country today
privileges such force as a teacher or administrator ''reasonably believes to
be necessary for (the child's) proper control, training, or education." To
the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator in
33
virtually all States is subject to possible civil and criminal liability.

oJd child. Mary was convicted of manslaughter, but the mitigating circumstances reduced her penalty to
a shilling. Rex v. Conner, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; Kandice, K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment:
The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense- Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?~ 1998 U.
ILL. L. REV. 413,414 (1998).
30. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 274.
31. /d. at 275-76.
All pf the circumstances are· to be- taken into account in detennining whether the
punishment is reasonable in a particular case. Among the most important considerations
are the seriousness of the offense, the attitude and past behavior of the child, the nature
and severity of the punishment,-the age and strength of the child, and the availability of
less severe but equally effective means of discipline.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977); see Zirkel & Reichner~ supra note 15, at 275-76; see
also Buss, supra note 20, at 561-62.
32. Zirkel & Reichner~ supra note 15, at 275.
33. Ingraham; 430 U.S. at 661 (footnotes & citations omitted). ln setting out this principle in
Ingraham, the Court relied on the Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 147(2), which configured the in loco

•
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The Court, however, added a modem twist to its version of in loco
parentis that Blackstone had not included, that an additional raison
d'etre for a teacher's disciplinary power is "the maintenance of group
34
discipline." This new language departed from the traditional notion of
parental delegation of authority over one's own child only, and its
acceptance in a modernized version of in loco parentis explains to a
certain extent the doctrine's lingering life.
By the mid-1980s, scholars were tolling the death knell of in loco
35
In higher education, in loco parentis
parentis in public education.
likely w,as breathing its last By the 1960s, colleges and universities had
to scale back their ability to control their students through the in loco
36
parentis doctrine. ' In contrast, in loco parentis still had strong
adherents in public education through the mid-1980s, in different
jurisdictions and in different types of cases. And it likely remains as
strong as ever in some of those pockets, such as those states that
37
continue to allow corporal punishment
It maintains its current
presence, however, predominately as a rationale for relaxing the Fourth
Amendment protections for student searches and for stifling First
Amendment freedom of student speech.
Student searches were justified as long ago as 1930, when in loco
parentis was invoked as a defense when one teacher strip-searched a
38
teenage girl, looking for money stolen from another teacher.
The
appellate court ruled the jury should have been instructed properly on
the parameters of in loco parentis and the teacher's authority: whether
the search was done lawfully for purposes of the child's educational
training (in loco parentis) or unlawfully for the purpose of retrieving

parentis disciplinary power as follows:
(2) One other than a parent who has been given by law or has voluntarily assumed in
whoJe or in part the function of controlling, training, or educating·. a child, is privileged to
apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement as he reasonably
believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education, except in so far as
the parent has restricted the privilege of one to whom he has entrusted the child.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 147(2) (1965).

34. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 662.
35. See Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269-70; see generally Zirkel & Reichner, supra
note 15.
36. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 281-82; DAVID A. HOEKEMA, CAMPUS RULES AND
MORAL COMMUNITY: IN PLACE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS 12-13,28-31 (1994); see generally Peter F. Lake,
The Rise of Duty and the Fall of In Loco Parentis and Other Protective Tort Doctrines in Higher
Education, 64 Mo. L. REV. I (1999).
37. See, e.g., Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 464-66 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007).
38. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 276. The girl was forced to remove her outer clothing
and her bloomers in search of the money that was allegedly stolen.
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money belonging to a third person (not in loco parentis).
Student
search jurisprudence was quiescent until 1969, when a California court
ruled that in loco parentis authorized a vice principal's search of a
student locker for drugs because he stood in the shoes of the parent and
could use similar "moderate force to obtain obedience" as the parent
40
could.
The doctrine then took on a life of its own as schools became
increasingly concerned about drugs on campus.
Through a number of permutations, the in loco parentis doctrine
eventually changed the balance between schools and their students'
41
Fourth Amendment privacy rights,
culminating in New Jersey v.
T.L.O, where a school official searched a student's purse and found
42
marijuana and related paraphernalia.
In that case, the Supreme Court
addressed two primary issues that were intertwined with the in loco
parentis doctrine. First, the Court held that school officials cannot
shield themselves from constitutional analysis under the Fourth
Amendment by arguing that, by reason of in loco parentis; they are
private actors like parents: "In carrying out searches and other
disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and
they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the
43
Fourth Amendment.'·' Having disposed of the in loco parentis doctrine
to hold school officials are state actors, the Court had a vacuum to fill:
there was no established rationale for school disciplinary power other
than in loco parentis. As a consequence, the Court needed a reason to
allow schools to invade students' Fourth Amendment privacy rights,
especially searches, while foregoing the need for warrants and probable

39. Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354, 355-56 (Tenn. Ct. App. l930).
40. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 265; In, re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (CaL Ct.
App. 1969). The California ,c ourt ultimately held that the vice principal was not a government official
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment so his search was not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. /d.
at 222. That holding is no longer good law. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1293 (CaL 1985); see also
infra notes 42 44 & accompanying text; Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 276-78.
41. See Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 266--69; Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 27677; In Interest of L.L., 280 N.W.2d 343, 349-50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). The primary modus operandi
was that school officials need not have probable cause to search students and their belongings and
lockers. All that was necessary was a reasonab]e, suspicion that a student possessed an illegal or
dangerous item. /d. at 351-52.
42. 469 U.S. 325 (1985); see also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269; Zirkel & Reichner,
supra note 15, at 277-78.
43. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37. In its analysis, the Court emphasized that "parenta1 delegation"
was not an appropriate source of school authority because of compulsory ,attendance laws. Furthermore,
schools exercise- public authority when engaging in student searches in light of Court precedent
requiring that they similarly exercise public authority under the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. /d. at 336 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S.503 (1969); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)).

.
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44

cause.
The test the Court developed certainly departed from the in loco
parentis doctrine of disciplining students. The Court's test "balanc[es]
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails,''
juxtaposing. the students' Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy
45
This regime rested on the modem
against the state's need for order.
institutional premise of
the substantial interest of teachers and administrators irt maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. . . . [T]he preservation
of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision
of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that
46
would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.

This regime would permit schools' flexibility in their disciplinary
procedures while likewise preserving the informality of the relationships
47
Requiring schools to get warrants
between students and teachers.
before they search students is unsuitable to an environment where
discipline must be swift and informaL Likewise, this environment is
unsuitable to requiring teachers to familiarize themselves with the
niceties of probable cause. Therefore, all a school official must show is
that the search was reasonable at its inception a reasonable suspicion
that a student is violating either the law or a school rule and reasonable
48
in its scope.
With this effort, the Court seemed to abandon in loco
parentis for a more modem treatment of the student-school relationship
whereby a school's disciplinary actions are guided by norms set out in
school rules and the law, definitive benchmarks as well as hallmarks of
49
modem public education.
44. /d. at 338-40.
45. !d. at 337
46. /d. at 339.
47. /d. at 340.

48. /d.at341-42.
49. For the proposition that the Court killed in loco parentis once and for all in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., see Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269-70, and Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 278.
On the other hand, Justice Powell had a tough time giving up in loco parentis and concurred in New
Jersey v. TL.O. on notions of in loco parentis "lite":
The special relationship between teacher and student also distinguishes the setting within
which schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity;
to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing
of such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between
school authorities and pupils. Instead, there is a commonality of interests between
teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal
responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for his education.
The primary duty .o f school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education
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Inexplicably,_ten years later, the Court reverted to the familiar in loco
parentis.
The need to justify random urinalysis testing of high school athletes
impelled the Supreme Court to once again visit the balancing of Fourth
Amendment rights with the government interests in Vernonia School
50
District 47J v. Acton.
But unlike the New Jersey v. T.L.O. Court, the
Vernonia Court relied heavily on in loco parentis in ultimately
determining that the school district's Student Athlete Drug Policy was
constitutional: "[W]hen the government acts as guardian and tutor the
relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian
and tutor might undertake. Given the findings of need made by the
51
District Court, we conclude that in the present case it is.'' The Court
abandoned the fairly rational balancing test of New Jersey v. T.L.O. and
instead applied the in loco parentis doctrine to diminish students'' Fourth
Amendment expectations of privacy. Rather than justify the drugtesting scheme within a legitimate govennnental interest in maintaining
order and discipline in schools, the Court created a different
govermnental interest victims that the school district must protect: "( 1)
children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody ofthe
52
State as schoolmaster."
In supporting this rationale, the Court acknowledged that in lo_co
parentis may no longer be a shield from constitutional inquiry,
particularly in light of compulsory attendance laws. Nevertheless, the
Court needed a reason to protect the victims it had created and found it
in the "custodial and tutelary" power of schools, thereby "pertnitting a
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free
53
adults." Having reduced students' Fourth Amendment expectations of
privacy because of the victims created by the in loco parentis doctrine,
the Court still felt compelled to justify this new "duty'' to protect and
returned to in loco parentis to describe the government's need as
and training of young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring_that theschools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, the
school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also
to protect teachers themselves from violence-by the few students whose conduct in recent
years has prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with
history to argue that the full panoply of constitutional rules applies with the same force
and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal laws.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
50. 515 u.s. 646 (1995).
51. !d. at 665.
52. /d. at 664.
53. /d. at 655. The Court, however, took great pains to note that in loco parentis discipline and
control of students did not translate into the -c ommensurate in loco parentis duty to protect. ld.
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"important enough" to justify random urinalyses.
Both these
arguments one for control and discipline and the other for care and
protection are classic ingredients of in loco parentis, even if the Court
did not specifically mention either Blackstone or the Latinism. But the
Court's authoritarian tendencies remain focused on the school districts'
right to discipline and not on the concomitant duty to protect, except in
rationalizing the expansion of school district discretion to control and
55
discipline.
The Court -used nearly the same reasoning later to justify
g testing of all middle and high
suspicionless yet mandatory
school students who wished to participate in extracurricular activities in
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
56
Pottawatomie County v. Earls.
In that case, the Court ratified the
school district's policy without requiring any particularized or
identifiable drug problem within this particular population to justify
regular drug-testing because there was (and remains) a "nationwide
.

.

54. ''[T]he Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care." Id. In further support for
reintroducing in loco parentis into the analysis of restricting Fourth Amendment rights, the Court went
to great pains. to gather evidence of the need for control and discipline. necessary to maintaining the
school's educational mission: "And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just
upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted." ld.
at 662. Indeed, the Court noted the school district's very real concerns:
We are not inclined to question indeed, we could not possibly find clearly erroneous.the District Court's conclusion that "a large segment of the. student body, particularly
those involved in interscholastic athJ~tics, was in a state of rebellion/' that "[d]isciplinary
actions had reached 'epidemic proportions,'" and that "the rebel1ion was being fueled by
alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student's misperceptions about the drug
culture."

/d. at 662--63 (alteration in original). The Court also made equally plausible arguments based on the
physical and psychological effects that drugs have on children, including the substantial physical risks
run by drug-using student~athletes while playing sports. But overarching aH concerns are those for the
"victims" not the individual student and the student's Fourth Amendment rights: ~'[T]he necessity for the
State to act is magnified by the fact -that this evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but
upon children for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility ofcate and direction." ld. at 662.
55. Curious then is the Court's continued commitment to excluding any duty to protect from the
school district's roster of educational responsibilities, particularly any constitutional duty to protect
children as held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department ofSocial Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. Thus, the Court's commitment to in loco parentis remained on the discipline
and control end of the parental duty and elevating it to such constitutional imperative, of such high
governmental importance, as to limit students' Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy but without
any enforceable duty to protect. Thus, that "duty" as posited in Vernonia is ephemeral and merely a
rhetorical bludgeon to justify expanding a school district;s disciplinary power but not its protective
duties.
56. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). In Earls, the school district's policy applied to any student who wanted
to participate in extracurricular activities, such as FFA, band,. choir, National Honor Society, and the

1ike.
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57

epidemic of drug use."
According to the Court, this generalized
evidence was sufficient government interest for a school district to
protect children in its care from that drug-use epidemic. In doing so, the
Court also necessarily diminished those children's constitutional rights
because of the unchallengeable assertion that a "student's privacy
interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is
58
responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety" and "to
59
prevent and deter the substantial hartn of childhood drug use."
By
these pronouncements, the Court abandoned any objective standard of
detertnining whether student searches have anything to do with the
violation of school rules. Furthermore, the institutional mission to
maintain order and control is subservient to the nearly limitless
discretion afforded to the school's "protective" function. Although in
loco parentis power of schools historically derived from their
disciplinary function, the Court in Earls appealed to the converse the
protective side of a parent's role for which there is little historical
support, legal tradition, or case precedent and certainly no nortns.
What little legal precedent exists for this strange turn in the fortunes
of the in loco parentis doctrine was fed in large measure by a First
Amendment case. In fashioning this protective rationale in student
search cases, the Court relied heavily on the in loco parentis doctrine set
6
out in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. ° Fraser involved a
school district's defense against a § 1983 suit brought by a student who
had been disciplined for making a sexually suggestive campaign speech
during a student assembly.
In upholding the school district's
disciplinary action, the Court emphasized that schools acting in loco
parentis must protect children from being exposed to indecent, lewd, or
61
sexually explicit speech because schools' educational mission is to
"inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
62
democratic political system. "
According to the Court, this role is an
important government interest to be balanced against students' First

57. /d. at 836. The school did put on evidence that there was illegal "drug use" in the school
district but none that would target this particular student population. /d. at 834-35. Consequently, there
could be no particularized suspicion of any individual's being a drug user or rule violator, as required in
New Jersey v. T.L.O.
58. !d. at 830.
59. /d. at 836.
60. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Justice Scalia specifically quoted Fraser's in loco parentis passagetaking some liberties with its actual usage as part of the Court's rationale in upholding the random
drug-testing in Vernonia. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
61. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
62. /d. at 681, 683.
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63

Amendment rights. This role gives a school district the sole discretion
to determine what speech is appropriate to the school:
[S]chools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
order.
Consciously or otherwise, teachers and indeed the older
students demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class.
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.
The schools, as
instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil,
mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd,
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this
64
confused boy.

With little more government interest than this, the Court determined
that the school had the better part of the balance against the First
Amendment. This precedent, which touts the schools' parental and
tutelary responsibilities, proved useful for balancing against students'
Fourth Amendment rights in the student search cases and demonstrates
how in loco parentis came to be resurrected.
Unfortunately, in loco parentis fails as a rational support for giving
school boards the nearly unlimited discretion that courts persist in
according them. It is chiefly a doctrine devised by the law that has little
application to how education professionals actually do or should run
their schools. The key to eliminating it, therefore, is to demonstrate how
the legal interpretation of the doctrine is wrong, or at least has been
misapplied in public education law.

Ill. IN LOCO PARENTIS "WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY IMPROVED BY DEATH"

65

As a preliminary matter, any knowledge that teachers and school
administrators have about in loco parentis likely has more to do with
their experiences as undergraduate students than from information
intentionally conveyed to them during a teacher training program.
Indeed, there is little literature that instructs teachers how to act in loco
parentis. An infortnal Internet search revealed primarily materials

63. "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." /d. at 681.
64. /d. at 683. The Court made particular note that U .S. Senators have been censured for abusive
language on the floor and likened schools to the Senate: why should students have more freedoms than
U.S. Senators? !d. at 682. Since then, of course, we have had a Vice President utter an obscenity"F@*# you!" on the floor of the chamber to a sitting Senator without repercussion. Helen Dewar &
Dana Milbank, Cheney Dismisses Critic with Obscenity, WASH. POST, June 25, 2004, at A4.

65. H.H.

MUNRO ("Saki"),

(Doubleday & Co. 1976).

The Feast of Nemesis, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SAKI 322
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relating to legal decisions. A cursory glance through contemporary
books on education history and strategies yielded a similar conclusion.
The only references to in loco parentis are limited to matters of
66
historical significance or legal opinions.
Some contemporary
67
educational texts do not even list the Latinism in their indices.
For all the folderol that goes on in courts concerning in loco parentis,
one would think that professional educators would be versed in this
doctrine. That, however, is not the case. Indeed, a fairly recent, albeit
small, survey of teachers indicated that many did not know what in loco
parentis means; the majority of respondents stated that they had no right
68
to react to students as a parent would.
A more comprehensive survey
is likely unnecessary to conclude that educators do not rely on the in
loco parentis doctrine because it is meaningless to them. Perhaps the
lack of familiarity exists because the phrase has a meaning pertinent
69
only to the law and not useful to professional educators. As a term of
art, it provides teachers no guidance in classroom management, and
professional educators would not touch the doctrine with a ten-foot
barge pole because it is descriptive, not normative. It is a legalism not
modem reality.
In loco parentis lingers because it takes the burden off courts from
questioning the discretion of school board decisions. Ironically, the
doctrine only reached that evolutionary stage by misinterpreting
Blackstone's use of the Latinism, by limiting it to school discipline
without regard to the obligations imposed by standing "in the place of a
parent."
66. See, e.g., RODGER W. BYBEE & E. GORDON GEE, VIOLENCE, VALUES, AND JUSTICE IN THE
SCHOOLS (1982) (history); JOAN C. HARLAN & SIDNEY T. ROWLAND, BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS: ACHIEVING INSTRUCTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, STUDENT SUCCESS, AND
STUDENT MOTIVATION EVERY TEACHER AND ANY STUDENT CAN! (Charles C. Thomas, 2d ed. 2002)
(legal).
67. See, e.g., RALPH M. GERSTEIN & LOIS A. GERSTEIN, EDUCATION LAW: AN ESSENTIAL
GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, PARENTS AND STUDENTS (2d ed. 2007); THE
SAGE HANDBOOK OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP: ADVANCES IN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE
(Fenwick W. English ed., 2005); R. MURRAY THOMAS, WHAT SCHOOLS BAN AND WHY (2008); WAYNE
J. URBAN & JENNINGS L. WAGONER, JR., AMERICAN EDUCATION: A HISTORY (Routledge 4th ed. 2009).
68. Anthony E. Conte, In Loco Parentis: Alive and Well, 121 Enuc. 195, 196-97 (2000). The
survey seems a bit misdirected. The thesis is good: how to improve educator-parent colJaborations. But
couching that thesis based on whether teachers are or are not familiar with the legal parameters of in
loco parentis seems a bit tangential, particularly when the author of the survey noted that only about
18.3% of respondents had discussed the doctrine in their teacher preparation programs. /d. at 198-99.
One of the conclusions that perhaps would have been more valid is that, if in loco parentis is not being
taught in teacher preparation courses, there might be a good reason not to.
69. This legalistic usage of the Latinism may be similar to that attributable to "insanity" and its
distinctive use by the legal profession but not by the medical profession. See, e.g., Stanley Fish,
Empathy and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/empathyand-the-law/?ref=opinion.
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A. What Blackstone Really Meant
It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.

-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

70

Perhaps the starting point in unraveling the erroneous interpretation of
Blackstone's in loco parentis doctrine and tracing it to its current revival
is to discern what parental rights and responsibilities might inform in
loco parentis, even as a descriptive as opposed to normative standard.
Until recently, parents' rights over their children were almost limitless in
the United States, and individual states were loath to interfere in the
71
parent-child relationship. The legal authority of a parent over a child
was virtually unquestioned because that authority was "understood to be
grounded in natural law and ... not dependent on behavior that
72
Even today, legal treatment of the
promoted the child's interest."
parent-child relationship remains mired in ancient tradition and "accords
unwarranted legal protection to biological parents in ways that are both
directly harmful and symbolically corrosive to the interests of their
73
children." Although it seems unlikely that parents would entrust their
children to another so they could be used and abused in ways that are
unquestioned by the law, this reluctance to interfere in the parent-child
relationship could naturally be construed as inuring to one who is in loco
parentis. So the historical perspective points to the seeds of a school
official's nearly unlimited discretion.
At the same time, the law has been slow to recognize parents' duties
toward their children, the responsibility to protect and care for them.
Depending upon the jurisdiction, criminal statutes have recognized a
parental duty to protect by imposing sanctions for child neglect and
74
child abuse. Under tort law, an affirmative duty of a parent to protect
70. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2407
(1995).
72. /d. at 2407.
73. /d. at 2406. One specific aspect that the courts and legislatures both have been loath to
address is parental use of corporal punishment. Even in criminal cases, parents may have a "parental
corporal punishment privilege" as a justification defense to criminal charges for using force against their
children. "[T]he greatest problem emanating from the parental privilege to use disciplinary force is that
in an attempt to accommodate traditional disciplinary practices, current standards hedge on the issue of
whether parents can physically injure their child." Johnson, supra note 29, at 418.
74. Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect Minor
Children, 51 YILL. L. REv. 311, 312-13 (2006).
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a child has been slow to evolve. As the American Law Institute prepares
to launch its new Restatement (Third) of Torts, it has noted that "there
has been almost no judicial consideration of the affirmative duties of
75
family members to each other." Consequently, we also have the seeds
for a general reluctance to impose any duties on schools for the safety of
76
the children in their charge.
So did Blackstone really mean, when he described the common law
responsibilities of the teacher as in loco parentis, that teachers would
have nearly unbridled discretion in the charge of children? His language
suggests he did:
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,

75. /d. at 316. The American Law Institute further stated that "a number of ... courts do not
view the parent's duty to the child as an affirmative one." RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40, cmt. o, Reporter's Notes (Proposed Final Draft No. I, April 6, 2005).
Ironically, the Restatement (Third) of Torts does acknowledge that there might be an affinnative duty
between a parent and minor child under a custodial duty, but not necessarily as a special parent-child
relationship. /d. at cmt. n. The custodial duty would generally recognize an affinnative duty of a
custodian to one in custody, such as children in day-care, prisoners, hospital patients, children in
summer camp, and the like. /d. at cmt. n, Reporter's Notes.
This attitude may go a long way toward explaining the near dearth of parental duties to
children mentioned in leading literature that espouses parental rights in the education of their children.
See, e.g., Tara Dahl, Surveys in America's Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really Know?, 37 J. L. &
Eouc. 143, 148-49 (2008) (author posits a general parental duty to provide education without any
enforceable rights in children or from the state); Linda L. Schlueter, Parental Rights in the Twenty-First
Century: Parents as Full Partners in Education, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 611 (2001); see also Eric A.
Degroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozer! after 20 Years, 38 J.L. &
Eouc. 83, 108-12 (2009). Degroff makes a persuasive case that legal scholars imposed a duty upon
parents to provide children with an education, particularly from English philosophers and scholars. But
he makes no persuasive case that parents have ever been held accountable for that duty. Indeed, he
concedes that point when he states that parents will be held accountable for breach of that duty only if
there is a "clear omission." /d. at 112. He merely uses the duty as a neat segue to his primary thesis that
parents' rights to control education are fundamental. !d. at II 0--11. Implicitly, his posture seems to
il1ustrate the concern that Justice Douglas expressed in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972)
(Douglas, J. dissenting in part):
Our opinions are full of talk about the power of the parents over the child's education ...
. And we have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between parent and State with little
regard for the views of the child.. . . Recent cases, however, have dearly held that the
children themselves have constitutionally protectible interests.
Furthennore, a duty to provide an education is easily confused with the parental right to direct a child's
upbringing. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
76. As it turns out, of course, courts are also reluctant to impose a duty to protect on schools. At
most, they will impose a duty to supervise, but because of the exigencies of the nature and of the number
of children under their care, school districts generally do not have a duty to protect. They clearly have
no constitutional duty to protect if courts follow DeShaney in the school context. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts, however, recognizes a special student-school relationship that may alter that notion a
bit. RESTATEMENT (TH1RD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM§ 40 (Proposed Final Draft No.
I, April 6, 2005).
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and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge,
viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the
77
purposes for which he is employed.

Parsing the meaning of any common law doctrine is often difficult.
Unlike statutes in which legislators presumably have chosen precise
words that courts can interpret the connnon law is usually gleaned
from the ideas that the words are intended to convey. What is clear is
that Blackstone was not any more specific about what he meant by in
loco parentis than what we know about parental rights. If we examine
the text no further, we find no outermost limits to the relationship of the
teacher to the child than we do about the relationship of the parent to the
child, at least from this minimal fraction of Blackstone's work that has
been quoted time and again as the foundation for court decisions about
student-school relationships.
Two options remain: we can examine the context of Blackstone's in
loco parentis provision, and we can examine how courts have
interpreted that provision. In examining both, we find that in loco
parentis is out-dated (if it was ever proper) and is useless in guiding
either courts or schools.
First, the context of Blackstone's statement is both textual where in
his Commentaries it arises and temporal when it was written.
Textually, Blackstone's in loco parentis pronouncement appears in
Book I, The Rights of Persons, in Chapter Sixteen, ''Of Parent and
Child." In that chapter, Blackstone related the civil law principle that a
man who has children has the duty to provide maintenance if they
78
Their protection, while not
cannot otherwise provide for themselves.
79
required, is pertnitted by law.
Blackstone also posited that parents
have a duty to educate their children suitably to their station in life but
acknowledged that the law of England articulated that duty in only two
instances: apprenticeship education of the poor and penalties on parents
who sent their children out of England for a Roman Catholic
80
education. Otherwise, only natural law suggested that parents educate
their children or face the consequences of being saddled with
81
uneducated issue.
Concurrent with these parental duties, Blackstone described the legal
foundation for parental powers: "The power of parents over their
77. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *441.
78. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *436-37.
79. I d. at *438.
80. I d. at *439.
81. /d. Consequently, "[t)he rich indeed are left at their own option, whether they will breed up
their children to be ornaments or disgraces to their family." ld.
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children is derived from the fortner consideration, their duty; this
authority being given them, partly to enable the parent more effectually
to perform his duty, and partly as a recompence for his care and trouble
82
in the faithful discharge of it." Although an ancient Roman father had
the power of life and death over his children, a contemporary English
father had power "much more moderate; but still sufficient to keep the
child in order and obedience. He may lawfully correct his child, being
under age, in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his
83
education."
Although Blackstone placed his provision for in loco
84
parentis within this description of parental power, the overall context
places Blackstone's reference to in loco parentis as equally referring to
both duties and powers of parents to be placed in the hands of the "tutor
or schoolmaster" as it can to being limited to just a delegation of
disciplinary power. The conjunction "and" and the limiting phrase "as
may be necessary to answer the purposes for whic·h he is employed"
suggest that the last phrase of Blackstone's charg.e merely limits the
disciplinary power of the schoolmaster or tutor without otherwise
diminishing the parental duties of support and protection that he the
schoolmaster or tutor must likewise undertake~
The latter and broader interpretation makes more sense in the
temporal context than the narrow limits courts have attributed to the
doctrine as applying to disciplinary power only. This interpretation is
also congruent with the contemporary treatment of apprenticeships. The
apprenticeship programs were a transfer of parental custody of a child to
a master, who stood in loco parentis to the child and "provid[ed]
85
education and support in return for the minor's Iabor."
Thus, the in
loco parentis doctrine for apprenticeship educational programs was not
confined to the master's capacity to discipline the apprentice. Masters
also had an enforceable duty to provide education and support to their
apprentices. Indeed, one U.S. court ruled that an ''[a]pprenticeship
would remain a binding indenture that required education and support in
86
return for labor"
because the master's "responsibilities existed
87
independently from [the apprentice's] ability to work for him." Thus,
'

•
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'

82. /d. at *440.

83. Id. (footnote omitted)
84. The doctrine is hard on the heels of Blackstone's assertion that the "power'' of the parent
extends even beyond death so that he may, by his wiH, appoint a guardian for his children. /d. at *44).
85. James D. Schmidt, ''Restless Movements Characteristic of Childhood": The Legal
Construction of Child Labor in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 315, 320
(2005). As Blackstone pointed out, apprenticeships were generally used by the poor for educational
purposes. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86. Schmidt, supra note 85, at 321.
87. /d. at 322.
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in the temporal context of Blackstone's authorship, the common
understanding of in loco parentis even in the United States- extended
beyond parental discipline.
Blackstone's application of in loco parentis to schoolmasters and
tutors likely would not have been much different than that commonly
given in apprenticeship programs. He wrote the -C ommentaries in the
mid-eighteenth century when English schools were not creatures of the
88
When the rich exercised their Hnatural'' duty to educate, they
state.
voluntarily exercised that right, rather than being mandated by the state.
Their educational options were also not state-run; Parliament considered
89
education voluntary. Around that time, England provided education in
90
a variety of organizational forms, the most common of which included
home instruction; Dame Schools; Latin Grammar schools; "public"
91
None of these; options were large
schools; and universities.
institutions except perhaps the universities and, in many respects,
92
relied upon either in-house or residential instruction.
93
Blackstone was not an ardent supporter of state-run education.
Although he was considered instrumental in the movement of reformminded, eighteenth-century England, the underlying "philosophy was
94
predo-minantly individualistic and utilitarian." Hence, two of his sons
95
attended Cheam, a private classical boarding school ''where the Master
88. FREDERICK EBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EDUCATION: IN THEORY, ORGANIZATION,
AND PRACTICE 266 (2d ed. 1952); NICHOLAS HANS, NEW TRENDS IN EDUCATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 15 (1951).
89. EBY, supra note 88, at 266.
90. HANS, supra note 88, at I 7-24.
91. Home instruction consisted of private tutors for older children and nurses for younger
children. Dame Schools were "a combination nursery and primary school conducted by a mistress who
divided her time between teaching and domestic tasks." EBY, supra note 88, at 267. The "dames"
running the schools often could barely read and write, and their primary educational goals were to teach
religious passages, the alphabet, and easy words for reading. The Latin grammar schools, although
becoming obsolete, focused on a classical education based on learning Latin. /d. at 90, 268. By the
eighteenth century, only the rich could afford the nurses and tutors necessary for children to succeed at
the Latin grammar schools. The ''great public schools" established in England w,e re boarding schools,
often affiliated with a college. Although at first formed for the education of pour boys, they eventually
became the bastions of the aristocracy. !d. at 38; HANS, supra note 88, at 17-19. And, of course, higher
education was offered by Oxford and Cambridge, which at that time "did not look upon the
advancement ofknowledge as one of their functions." EBY, supra note 88, at 268;
92. Similarly, private school options were the only educational opportunities in colonial North
America. See, e.g., BYBEE & GEE, supra note 66, at 24-25.
93. EBY, supra note 88, at 372.
94. /d. Although the eighteenth centUry saw England in a period of transition with regard to
refortning education, those reforms were slow to gain traction~ particularly because of the English
character of the time: "While politically democratic, they were economically individualistic and socially
worshipers of aristocracy.'' /d. at 370.
95. HANS, supra note 88, at 117, 123. These boarding schools grew up in opposition to the
classical Latin grammar schools and their teaching methods. "Most teachers [in Latin schools] had
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himself boarded the boys and was more of a 'paterfamilias' than the
96
Blackstone's in loco
distant demi-god of a large public institution."
parentis charge therefore must be understood to mean that a parent may
transfer authority over the child to a tutor (typically employed in the
household) or schoolmaster (of a boarding school). And in this temporal
context, Blackstone likely meant that when a parent contracted for these
residential arrangements for a tutor or schoolmaster, parents were
conveying both welfare and tutelary responsibilities, not just disciplinary
duties. Indeed, English education law did not confine the in loco
parentis doctrine to disciplinary authority but interpreted this parental
delegation also to require that the schoolmaster act as a "reasonably
97
prudent and careful parent." In fact, under English law, Blackstone's
in loco parentis imposed duties on the teacher that might exceed those of
98
the parent. But this is not how U.S. courts have interpreted or used in
loco parentis.
B. How U.S. Courts Got It Wrong
[We] have really everything in common with America nowadays, except,
of course, language.

-Oscar Wilde

99

Although giving frequent lip-service to Blackstone's in loco parentis
doctrine, U.S. courts never adopted the accurate cormnon law tradition
10
in public education though they did for higher education. ° First,
neither method nor sound learning themselves, but they knew how to beat the child without mercy."
EBY, supra note 88, at 126.
96. HANS, supra note 88, at 11 7.
97. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 263; see Starr v. Crone; (1950) 4 D.L.R. 433, citing to
Williams v. Eady, (1893) 10 T.L.R. 41, for the standard. See also Myers v. Peel (County Bd. of Educ.),
(1981) 123 D.L.R. (3d) l. Courts in New York have used the standard of "a parent of ordinary
prudence" but in the context of defining a teacher's duty of supervision. E.g.. Lawes v. Bd. of Educ.,
213 N.E.2d 667,668 (N.Y. 1965); Ohman v. Bd. ofEduc., 90 N.E.2d 474,475 (N.Y. 1949). As further
discussed, infra, the duty of supervision in U.S. public education law does not rise to a level of duty to
protect and is conceptually separate from in loco parentis.
98. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 264; see generally Jean LeDrew Metcalfe, "[T} here
could not be a better definition": A Defence of the Careful or Prudent Parent Standard, 13 Enuc. & L.J.
257 (2003).
99. OSCAR WILDE, The Cantervi/le Ghost, in LORD ARTHUR SAVILE'S CRIME AND OTHER
STORIES 89, 94 (1891 ).
100. In loco parentis in higher education recognized the college's duty to protect student welfare.
See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a Nonprofit
Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REv. 851, 856-58 (2002); Theodore C.
Stamatokos, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the Student-College Relationship, 65
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U.S. public education law cases misinterpreted in loco parentis to mean
a transfer of only the parent's disciplinary authority without the
concomitant welfare duty, unlike the English cases. In the alternative,
even if not misinterpreted, in loco parentis is not the appropriate
standard to use in a state-run public institution governed by compulsory
education laws. As a consequence of either problem, the doctrine's
resurrection from its late-twentieth-century doldrums was based on
outdated, outmoded, and unworkable reasoning.
First, courts in the United States never really adopted in loco parentis
as a usable doctrine of behavior for professional educators but merely as
a convenient legal Latinism for something distinct from Blackstone's
meaning. Courts used the doctrine almost exclusively to justify school
discipline. As noted above, in loco parentis was the foundation for
cases examining corporal punishment and student searches in the United
101
States.
In fortnulating that foundation, courts latched onto
Blackstone's reference to "restraint and correction" as the underlying
102
delegation of a single power.
Perhaps for those colonial schools in
the same temporal context as Blackstone's, adopting in loco parentis
might have made sense as the only available resource for legal authority.
But then courts did not also invoke the doctrine to hold public schools
accountable for the welfare of students.
Unlike English courts, U.S. courts have not recognized a reasonable
parental duty that teachers have over the welfare of their students. A
very few cases and a smaller number of jurisdictions have
recognized some fonn of duty to students that ostensibly arises from in
103
loco parentis.
That duty, however, was not based on the welfare of
the child but rather on the teacher's obligation to provide education and
104
training.
Courts were not willing to let teachers completely off the
hook for their responsibilities to students under the law, as parents might
be, but they were loath to impose a high level of responsibility on
IND. L.J. 4 71, 4 73 ( 1990); see also Gavin Henning, Is In Consortia Cum Parentibus the New In Loco
Parentis?, 44 NASPA J. 538, 539-40 (2007). The progenitor case, Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204
(Ky. 1913), "suggests that the in loco parentis doctrine imposes a duty to protect the physical welfare of
students." Stamatokos, supra, at 474. It has been suggested that the adoption of this familial model of
higher education, based on in loco parentis, was a result of U.S. institutions' efforts to imitate the
educational organizations of Oxford and Cambridge. Jackson, supra note 20, at 1135-36. In loco
parentis at the higher education level exhibited four different types of power wielded by colleges and
universities: the power to direct student behavior; the power to punish; the responsibility of care; and
partial immunity from limits on student searches. HOEKEMA, supra note 36, at 27-28.
101. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 273; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 262-63, 26568.
102. DeMitchell, supra note 20, at 19.
103. See generally Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 279- 81.
104. ld. at 280.
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105

teachers.
As a consequence, most jurisdictions that have weighed in
on the issue typically hold that a teacher only has a duty of supervision,
106
not a duty to the child's welfare.
In fact, the current trend seems to be
moving away from ensuring that students learn in a safe environment to
imposing liability only if the teacher's ·behavior constitutes wanton or
107
willful misconduct.
Thus, U.S. courts did not properly adopt the in
loco parentis doctrine as likely envisioned by Blackstone to include both
108
the welfare and disciplinary powers of the parent.
In the alternative, even if U.S. courts had fully embraced in loco
parentis, it is now obsolete. Current compulsory education laws require
109
parental delegation of their educational responsibility.
The Supreme
Court even cited this involuntary delegation as a rationale for moving
away from in loco parentis as the justification for corporal punishment:
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving
from the parents, the concept ofparental delegation has been replaced by
the view more consonant with compulsory education laws that the State
itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary
''for the pro~er education of the child and for the maintenance of group
1 0
discipline.''

l 05. /d. at 280.
106. "All teachers and administrators are expected to provide reasonable supervision of students
under their charge." NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERS 113 ( 1999). This duty of supervision presumably arose out of in loco
parentis. /d. at 116. But schoo]s are not insurers of student safety. Teachers only need act as a prudent
person would under the circumstances. GERSTEIN & GERSTEIN, supra note 67, at 228. One- author
suggests that in loco parentis as adopted by U.S. courts embraces the duty to protect. DeMitchell, supra
note 20, at 23-26; see also Peter Gallagher, Note, The Kids Aren't Alright: Why Courts Should Impose a
Constitutional Duty on Schools to Protect Students, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 377 (2001).
That author, however, relied on the Supreme Court rationales in its controversial student search cases.
Those rationales are primarily nonstarters in any lega1 sense because no other court irt the country has
recognized the duty to protect students, and the Court itself refuses to recognize any constitutional duty
to protect.
107. See Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research
and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 17 TEMP. L. REv. 641, 688 (2004).
108. A coup]e of mid-twentieth-century U.S. cases seem to posit the reasonable, prudent parent
standard to protect children. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 263-64. Closer examination of those
cases, however; reveals a closer kinship to the duty to supervise than a duty to protect. See Ohr,nan v.
Bd. ofEduc. of City of New York, 90 N.E.2d 474,475 (N.Y. 1949); Hoose v. Drumm, 22 N.E.2d 233,
234 (N.Y. 1939).
109. See generally Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 26K
110. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (footnote omitted). Another court expressed it
this way:

[l]n a compulsory education system, the parent does not voluntarily yield his authority
over the child to the school, so the concept of delegated authority is of little use. We
agree with most courts that school officials have special duties with associated powers,
but we prefer not to tie them to the in loco parentis doctrine. Instead we view the school
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In fact, the Court's New Jersey v. T.L.O. student search opinion
seemed to have put the doctrine to bed in 1985: "Today's public school
officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them
by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly
111
mandated education and disciplinary policies."
New Jersey v. T.L. 0. was a perfect opportunity to kill in loco parentis
in its tracks. What does this doctrine interpreted to deal with
disciplinary measures have to do with a student search? Searches are
not disciplinary measures like corporal punishment although punishment
may arise from the fruits of the search. Instead, searches are a police
function perhaps a uniquely institutional function designed to create
a safe educational environment, not a parental function delegated to the
school. Regardless, the Supreme Court has staked its claim to revive in
loco parentis to student searches.
On the heels of New Jersey v. T.L.O. and during the mid-1980s, some
authorities suggested that the in loco parentis doctrine was dead or at
112
least so weakened that it soon would be.
But these authorities had not
counted on the Supreme Court's desire to take part in the War on Drugs.
The revival of the doctrine, as recounted above in Vernonia and Earls, is
not without logic. The Court seems to view its role as that of a parent,
or in any event, views hierarchical managers especially governmental
managers . as having superior abilities by the mere virtue of being
113
managers.
Their decisions are unquestionably correct.
This
reverence for school officials is doubly enticing because of the historical
reliance on in loco parentis as the source of school authority. Never
mind that modem educational managers have moved to more
professional standards; it has become a doctrine of convenience to
justify the Court's allowing school officials to wield discretion with
little oversight.
Even the Court's recent rationale is not in keeping with the in loco
parentis doctrine.
If one relies on Blackstone's version of the

as a special situation, in the same way that the border or an airport presents a special
situation 00. 0
Horton vo Goose Creek Indepo Scho Dist., 690 Fo2d 470, 481 no18 (5th Ciro 1982) (citations omitted);
Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 268.
Ill. New Jersey v. T.LOO., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985); see Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at
269-700
112. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269-70; Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 282. And
it is pretty much dead at the higher education level where, in fact, the doctrine made a great deal more
sense. E.g., Henning, supra note 100, at 541; Stamatakos, supra note 100, at 474-76. But see Randall
Bowden, Evolution of Responsibility: From In Loco Parentis to Ad Meliora Vertamur, 127 Eouc. 480
(2007).
113. See, e.g., Garcetti v. CebaiJos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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doctrine which the Court did in the recent cases then the delegation
of the power should be confined to· a particular child and a search of that
child. As a result, the Court has reasoned that in loco parentis is the
appropriate doctrine to protect other children. Unless there is a tutelary
lesson given to the searched (or "disciplined") child, the school officials
are searching on behalf of third parties. A parent's delegation of power
would not,. logically, cover that analysis. Searching a student for the
health and safety of the student body and the educational environment is
an institutional goal, not a delegation of power from a parent. It may be
114
a valid goal but is not sanctioned by the in loco parentis doctrine.
The parental equivalent is a mother's searching the neighbor children
before they can play with her children. The second logical problem is,
of course, that parents are the ones who sue school districts for student
search problems because they are not happy with the way schools are
conducting themselves vis a vis their children: "In the absence of any
other justification, the doctrine of in loco parentis has no applicability
where, as here, the parents agree with the child rather than the
115
school.''
In addition, the Court's rationale is not based on the U.S. version of in
loco parentis, which does not acknowledge a duty to protect. Not only
have all other U.S. courts to date shied away from imposing that duty
under in loco parentis, most states' cotnmon law traditions impose on
teachers nothing greater than a duty to supervise, which implies an
institutional obligation, and n·o t a duty to protect, which implies a more
personal, individualized obligation more akin to in loco parentis.
But that did not stop the Court's most recent evocation of the in loco
parentis doctrine, which exemplifies how far the Court is willing to rely
116
on the doctrine, in Morse v. Frederick.
Although backing away from
actually stipulating that in loco parentis was the basis for its decision,
the Court piggy-backed all the reasoning of its recent drug se·arch cases
to justify the discipline meted out by a school principal against a student
who refused to comply with the principal's order to remove a banner at
an off-campus, but school-sanctioned, event. The banner read "BONG
HiTS. 4 JESUS" so the principal couched her action in a school district
policy that forbade public student expression that advocated illegal drug
.

.

114. But see BYBEE & GEE, supra note 66, at 64-65 ("[T]he doctrine of in loco
parentis ... supports the notion that to maintain its effectiveness, education must be free of the
enforcement of individual rights guaranteed to citizens in general.;').
115. Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728, 734 n.19 (W.O. T~x. 1970) rev'd on other grounds, 460
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972); Breen v. Kabl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1037~38 (7th Cir. 1969); Zirkel & Reichner,
supra note 15, at 270.
116. 551
393 (2007).
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117

The case was postured in such a way that the Court could have
use.
relied on the disciplinary function of in loco parentis, but in doing so,
the Court could not have created a blanket ban on drug-related speech,
regardless of a school district's disciplinary rules.
Setting aside whether the Court majority really thought the banner
118
promoted illegal drug use,
the Court had to fumble its way to a
resolution that would put the Court's imprimatur on this censorship. Of
course, the Court majority's primary goal was to walk back the
undeniably long-lasting impact of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
119
Community School District.
But in doing so in Morse, the Court
could not decide whether the school district's role in limiting speech
hung on its disciplinary power the principal was compelled to act
120
because the banner was "in violation of established school policy" or its protective duty "[s]tudent speech celebrating illegal drug use at a
school event ... poses a particular challenge for school officials
working to protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug
22
121
abuse."
Although not explicitly endorsing in loco parentis,l the
Court supplanted it with something equally amorphous: that the "special
123
characteristics of the school environment"
empower school districts
117. /d. at 397-98.
118. What if the banner had said "DiNKY HOCKER SHOOTS SMACK"? This is no less
nonsensical and attention-getting than the banner, but then the Court would run into the problem of
censoring the title of a young adult novel that is touted as one of the most influential of the twentieth
century. See M.E. KERR, DINKY HOCKER SHOOTS SMACK (HarperTeen 1989); One Hundred Books that
Shaped
the
Century,
SCH.
LIBRARY
J.
(Jan.
1,
2000),
http://www.schoollibraryjoumal.com/index.asp?layout=article&articleld=CA 153035&q=dinky+hocker
+shoots+smack.
119. 393
503 (1969).
120. Morse, 551 U.S. at 398. "In loco parentis has been used to justify school rules in general."
Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 278.
121. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. "[S]chool boards know that peer pressure is perhaps 'the single
most important factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,' and that students are more likely to use
drugs when the nonns in school appear to tolerate such behavior." /d. One author suggests that the
Morse Court placed too great an emphasis on protection when the purpose of a democratic education is
preparation. Andrea Kayne Kaufman, What Would Harry Potter Say about BONG HiTS 4 JESUS?
Morse v. Frederick and the Democratic Implications of Using In Loco Parentis to Subordinate Tinker
and Curtail Student Speech, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 461,462 (2008).
122. On the other hand, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion clearly supports a return to and
strengthening of in loco parentis disciplinary powers in the schools. "In short, in the earliest public
schools, teachers taught, and students listened. Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers
did not rely solely on the power of ideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain order."
Morse, 551 U,S. at 412 (Thomas, J., concurring). As a consequence, Justice Thomas would defer
completely to the decisions of schools and not protect student speech at all. /d. at 421. A recent
analysis suggests that Thomas's dissent is historically inaccurate and merely "restorative nostalgia.,
David Blacker, An Unreasonable Argument Against Student Free Speech, 59 Eouc. THEORY 123, 13742 (2009).
123. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (majority opinion). This "test" enunciated in Morse "special
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"to detern1ine 'what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
124
Even if the Court implied in Morse that
assembly is inappropriate.'"
it abandoned its strange version of in loco parentis, all it did was put a
different mask on it without providing any normative guidance to
schools. Perhaps that was the point
Given their reliance on this vague and merely descriptive principle,
courts have given school officials carte blanche to treat students in a way
that does not comport with good educational practice.
As a
consequence, school districts believe it completely appropriate to stripsearch a female middle-school student to find prescription strength
ibuprofen with no evidence that the student might even have such pills,
125
much less in her underwear.
That this case wound its controversial
way to the Supreme Court is astounding.
Of course, lawyers are to blame for these problems. Professional
educators, for the most part, have never assumed that they have
discretion to do as they please with children's rights. Unfortunately, the
occasional school official does, and the courts approve that behavior,
reducing both students' rights and their teachers' duties to a caricature,
126
like Washington Irving's Ichabod Crane.
If the lawyers would listen
to the educators, they might learn about professional nortns and the outer
boundaries of institutional behavior.

IV. RELYING ON THE EXPERTS
Upon the subject of education ... I can only say that I view it as the most
important subject which we as a people may be engaged in.

-Abraham Lincoln

127

Rigidly applying in loco parentis to public schools comforted courts
that they were not stepping on schools' discretion. The result, however,
has been an abandonment of the law to the vagaries of school officials

characteristics of the school environment'' is hardly better than in loco parentis: it maintains the reality
of the in loco parentis test with a fa~ade of having some kind of "educational" quality to it. Indeed, the
Morse decision would have been better served by simply noting that the school had a disciplinary rule in
place rather than suggesting that all speech that has something to do with drugs is anathema to the
"special characteristics of the school environment."
124. /d. at 404.
125. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642-43 (2009).
126. See WASHINGTON IRVING, THE LEGEND OF SLEEPY HOLLOW (David McKay Co. 1928)
(1820).

127. Abraham Lincoln, First Political Announcement,
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creati ve/1 incoln/speeches/18 32 .htm.

Mar.

9,

1832,

available

at
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who have no guidance from the courts. As a consequence, courts
determine what in loco parentis means on an ad hoc basis rather than on
a consistent and rational basis of judging the perfortnance of school
districts and their employees, especially in light of students' individual
rights. In loco parentis has always been about the outer limits of power,
not how to run an institution. Retaining that analysis has benefited
school boards and school officials who have tested those outer
boundaries of conduct. This is not to say that those outer boundaries
should not be tested nor that problematic litigation does not sometimes
lie at the feet of litigious parents. But more than a fair number of public
education cases that have reached the appellate courts arose because of
extreme behavior by school officials. In an inordinate number of cases,
that behavior has been sanctioned by courts that treat those decisions
with undue respect.
The consequences for students have been enormous, from increasing
restrictions on student speech to loosening restrictions on how schools
can conduct student searches. Schools have been given license to reach
the outer boundaries of control by courts' countenancing institutional
and official behavior that is farther and farther from the reaches of
professional conduct.
Conversely, students do not enjoy the
concomitant protections for their safety in such things as sexual
harassment and bullying. While schools are afforded greater protections
from liability for affirmative disciplinary actions, they are also afforded
greater protections when they fail to protect students because protecting
students is not within the purview of this U.S. version of in loco
parentis. In other words, the courts and the Supreme Court in
particular are making law in accord with ill-advised school
administrators, not good school administrators.
In loco parentis has been rekindled for a couple of reasons. First, it is
a familiar doctrine most adaptable to acconunodating the outdated
notion that schools are analogous to parenting so, if parents' duties and
responsibilities have few limits, then schools' do too. As the reasoning
goes, if the courts give schools all the power that parents have, then
society will not have all these discipline problems. That is wishful
thinking. Saying it does not make it so and seems like legislating
futilely from the bench. Exhorting good behavior from the bench does
not translate well into the trenches. Discipline problems in schools are
not so easily solved, and rewarding inappropriate educational
administrative practices does not solve those discipline problems.
Second, schools are asked to do too much that is outside their original
purview yet are constantly scrutinized by parents and other stakeholders.
That courts give schools so little guidance on these legal matters is not
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helpful. Schools are expected to do innumerable things that are essential
to their charges' upbringing and future: "The process of educating our
youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the
curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the
128
To a certain degree,
shared values of a civilized social order."
schools have been put in the position, by default, of being both parent
and educator, but that position is not the same as being the parent with
unlimited discretion. In addition, the government has imposed on
schools the responsibility of being the drug police: "Congress has
declared that part of a school's job is educating students about the
dangers of illegal drug use. It has provided billions of dollars to support
129
Along with multiple other
state and local drug-prevention programs."
federal and state statutes imposing duties that are not necessarily
education-related, Congress imposed the disastrous No Child Left
Behind Act, which as if schools do not have enough to worry aboutthreatens schools with loss of funds if their students do not reach
130
prescribed levels of proficiency in targeted academic disciplines.
Tack onto that a parental rights movement that feels an obligation to tell
schools what to teach their children and a Court that recently devalued
131
it is a wonder there is
the government employee to voicelessness,
anybody left who would want to teach at all.
Given these issues, it is surprising that more cases of bad school
officials' behavior have not surfaced. Thus, if the cases the Court is
deciding on this absurd proposition are the minority, what is the majority
of school officials doing right? And if the majority is doing it right,
should courts adopt their strategies as guidance for those who are not?
Why not abandon the descriptive (and basically obsolete) doctrine of in
loco parentis and follow a more normative standard by which schools
128. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the anned forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust nonnally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
129. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007).
130. Gershon M. Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act Needs to Be Restroctured to
Accomplish Its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 1, 3-5, 8-9 (2007).
131. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 41 0 (2006); see Susan P. Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned If
You Do. Damned If You Don't, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281 (2008).
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can anticipate how to govern themselves and parents have leverage
when schools go astray?
Such a standard would derive not from a parental delegation of
authority but from a public delegation of authority. The power of
today's school district is no longer that of the personal and moral
convictions that might have informed the schoolmaster in a one-room
schoolhouse. Instead, "[t]oday's public school officials . . . act in
furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary
132
policies."
These mandates, as well as the constructs endorsed by
education, sociological, and psychological sources, would better serve
students and court decisions by establishing the norms of acceptable
school governance rather than by following the in loco parentis doctrine.
At their best, these norms would keep school districts out of litigation.
On the other hand, expert witnesses could establish such norn1s when a
133
school district's abuse of those nonns is in court.
Normative behavior is one of the fundamentals of teacher preparation.
Teachers have norms to follow in measuring their students'
achievement, to measure the effectiveness of their instruction, and in
complying with state law certification, as well any other number of
federal- and state-mandated standards. The No Child Left Behind Act is
all about norms. Teachers have norms to follow in curriculum
development, professional development, and classroom management.
Teachers must follow standards and guidelines, and educational
administrators are versed even more completely in normative behavior.
Logging on to the website of any professional school of education
134
reveals numerous courses devoted to norms.
Perhaps more
specifically, national professional education and school board
135
associations have codes of ethics that emphasize students' civil rights.
132. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,336 (1985).
133. In fact, the Supreme Court recently relied on nonnative research from education experts to
support its restrictions on strip searches: ~'The reasonableness of [Redding's) expectation . . . [of
privacy] is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched .... [A]
number of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and have
banned them no matter what the facts may be ...." Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S.
Ct. 2633, 2641-42 (2009).
134. E.g.,
Ind.
U.
Sch.
of
Educ.,
Teacher
Leader
Program,
http:/I education. indiana. edu/e Ips!Educational Leadersh i prf eacherLeaderPro gram/tabid/ 1020 1/Default.as
px;
U.
of
Ill.
Coli.
of
Educ.,
Educ.
Org.
&
Leadership,
http://courses.illinois.edu/cis/2009/spring/schedule!EOL/index.htm.l?skinld=2169.
135. Nat'l Ass'n of Secondary Sch. Principals, Ethics for School Administrators,
http://www.principals.org/Content.aspx?topic=47104; Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Code of Ethics,
http://www.nea.org/home/30442.htm; NAT'L SCH. BDS. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
SCHOOL
BOARD
MEMBERS,
http://www.nsba.org/MainMenu/Governance/
OtherBoardlssuesResourcesandReportsonSchoolGovernance/CodeofEthicsforSchoolBoardMembers.asp
X.
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In light of this exposure, the suggestions that follow are not new to
educational professionals although they might be strange and mysterious
to some school boards and their lawyers. They are nevertheless much
easier to follow and understand for teachers and school administrators.
In addition, they conform to an institutional framework for guidance, not
an ephemeral parental-custodial role.
Schools have many more
responsibilities and duties than parents so their norms must be
institution-specific and reflective of professionally run enterprises, not
of a loosely governed home-school paradigm. In acknowledgement of
those realties, courts must move past Victorian (and even colonial) ideas
of school organization and leadership and recognize school districts are
entities that can follow, and would probably welcome, better legal
guidance than the in loco parentis doctrine from the courts.
The following objective nortns of educational professionalism may
inforrn courts about what professional educators can do. Evidence of
such norrns would allow courts to judge school district behavior against
an objective standard. Furthermore, these norms are widely accepted
and can be attested to by an expert educational witness.
First, courts can judge schools by their rules. School districts must
have an environment that reflects and enforces their rules. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that behavior that violates school
136
rules is an appropriate basis for discipline.
Most school districts
strive for this type of environment because it is the only way the
institution can survive. State statutes and regulations require such rules.
School districts that fail to have a regularized disciplinary code and clear
school rules should not be rewarded with an amorphous, discretionary
standard under the "special characteristics of the school environment"
test. That judicial test says nothing that professional educators do not
already know and fails to establish guidelines. States require schools to
draft rules of conduct, rules that provide notice to students of the
behavior that will not be tolerated in schooL These rules are usually
formulated for student handbooks and distributed to students and parents
each year for purposes of due process notice. Professional school
districts do several things with those rules, which should be followed by
all school districts: (1) The rules must be current with both the law and
professional literature, and must go through the appropriate internal
review process and, when necessary, the appropriate public review
process for public comment; (2) counsel must regularly review the rules
in light of the current law and the professional literature, and should
explain what they mean to all the stakeholders; (3) the school district

136. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
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must assure the best method of dissemination of these rules to students
and parents; and (4) teachers and staff must be familiar with the rules
and be instructed on how they must enforce the rules. So long as the
rules pass legal muster, the courts have better guidance about the school
district's professionalism and leave little to the school district's
unbridled discretion.
Second, the school districts must have an environment that reflects
and enforces the basic welfare of their students. This objective leaves
less discretion for the courts than appears at first blush. It means that
school districts must draft not just standards for prohibiting bad behavior
to avoid discipline, but also guidelines that reflect a higher order of
137
behavior.
A school is fundamentally avoiding its basic educational
mission if it does not have both aspirations and prohibitions for its
students. These aspirations must reflect the needs of a safe environment
and current civil rights laws. A school district that intends to defend its
disciplinary actions as part of its educational mission must articulate that
mission. That mission includes, as the Court has rightly suggested, that
"schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers and indeed the older
students demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of
138
class."
The whole package is required, not just the disciplinary ann
of the state but also the tutelary arm of the state. Again, most school
districts understand the need for these aspirations, but they often fall
short of following through. These policies, if put into evidence in court,
would indicate whether the school district really is engaging in its
educational mission and whether to give the school the benefit of the
doubt when it comes before the court because of its disciplinary actions.
These policies would allow courts to say with some authority that the
schools' acts conform to professional educational standards.
Third, in the absence of a school rule that applies or might otherwise
affect a constitutional right imbued on a student, the Tinker doctrine
should be revived as a normative rule of school district conduct. If
student behavior does not "materially disrupt[] classwork or involve[]
139
then the
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others,"
137. See, e.g., BYBEE & GEE, supra note 66, at 217 44.
138. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)
139. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S . 503, 513 (1969). The irony is that
the Court is trying to move away from the Tinker rule for reasons that are not entirely clear but seem
designed to give more flexibility for schools to do strange things in which the Court chooses not to
interfere. The irony is that school districts are finding themselves having to go back to the Tinker model
to deal with off-campus, online speech that does not otherwise come within the "special characteristics"
of the institution nor otherwise have an immediate effect on the educational mission of the school but
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school district must ignore the small stuff. Most school districts
probably follow this rule of thumb anyway so why courts find it so
difficult to apply to schools is a mystery. Students will not behave
perfectly, and schools are prepared to deal with that truth, perhaps more
so than courts. But making students subject to discipline that has no
rationale is not a good model of school management. Why courts would
assume that school districts would, similarly, behave better without
clearer guidance is also perplexing. Besides, neither of these positions
will force parents to become more involved in civilizing their children or
imposing consequences for bad behavior at home. So long as schools
are saddled with the task of "inculcating fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system,'' they should have
standards and guidelines that courts should require they follow in their
disciplinary decisions.
A fourth objective guideline is reliance on best educational practices.
These practices may be internal, institutional guidelines, but there are
many professional education leaders and texts that outline how to run a
good school. Accreditation agencies judge school districts' best
practices, and professional employees are subject to review on their best
practices. The resources on these objective guidelines are easily
140
accessible and easily understandable.
Thousands of school
administrators follow them daily. Surely, school districts can explain
these to courts so they can be understood.
The fifth, and overarching, principle is assessing the school district's
ability to conduct itself as a democratic institution. Indeed, the Court's
charge to schools in Fraser is to inculcate democratic principles in their
students; democratic education is a primary function of schools. As a
consequence, schools must "walk the walk." This is not to say that
courts can or should second-guess a school board's organizational
scheme, but if litigation arises because the school district has failed to
conduct itself as a democratic institution, then the school board's ability
to run the institution becomes fair game. This objective norm is widely
touted in the literature as one of the most effective ways to run a modem
school district and anticipates a collaborative rather than a hierarchical
organization, sharing leadership with community and institutional
141
Not only does this model address many of the issues
stakeholders.
that does have a disruptive impact on the school environment. The Bethel Court's in loco
parentisl"basic educational mission" model is entirely unworkable in these circumstances, being
descriptive rather than nonnative. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
140. E.g., N. CENT. ASS'N COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION AND SCH. IMPROVEMENT,
ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS
FOR
QUALITY
SCHOOLS
(2007),
http://www.advanced. erg/accreditation/standards/advanced_schoo]_standards. pdf.
141. See, e.g., Frances K. Kochan & Cynthia J. Reed, Collaborative Leadership, Community
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raised in the No Child Left Behind Act, but it could also weaken
parental opposition to any particular policy or practice that might
otherwise be litigated. In fact, this collaborative model is the only one
that justifies the decision in Vernonia, that the school district
collaborated with the community to come up with what most
stakeholders believed was the best way to address a serious and rampant
142
Recognizing community standards of best practices
drug problem.
would surely be a much more objective test of the validity of a school
district's action than courts' continuing to limp along with the broad
discretionary standard that sprouted from the equally vague in loco
parentis doctrine.
These objective standards may be used singularly, in tandem, or for
particular situations. They are not exclusive, and they might not be
143
appropriate in all circumstances.
But they are all verifiable and
subject to proof during the course of litigation. For example, plaintiffs'
lawyers could call expert witnesses, from any school or department of
education at a local university, to testify to the best practices of a wellrun school district. Defense lawyers, if they want to justify the school
district's behavior, might introduce guidelines to support its decision,
although the likelihood of school boards wanting to voluntarily
circumscribe their virtually unlimited discretion is probably remote.
Proof of adherence to, or neglect of, these guidelines would be an issue
of fact decided by the trier-of-fact to assess the reasonableness of school
district behavior, particularly in balance against individual student
rights. If the school district cannot offer proof of its professional school
environment, then it probably cannot establish a government interest
sufficient to override an individual student's rights. Judges may finally
determine that the nearly unbridled discretion given to school boards is
too broad as a matter of law.
Part of the problem is that lawyers involved in school litigation want
to rely on legal concepts rather than concepts from other disciplines.
That is why courts have been guided by in loco parentis, rather than
something more practical. There may be any number of reasons for this
preference although sheer convenience comes to mind.
But the
education profession does not run itself by in loco parentis. Courts
Building, and Democracy in Public Education, in SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 68, 72-74.
142. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-50 (1995).
143. Student searches, especially drug searches, are a unique species of problem that is beyond the
scope of this Article. Briefly, however, student searches have become a police function that schools
have undertaken, both voluntarily and involuntarily, and that implicate issues that are tndy outside the
educational mission of schools. Considering the massive amount of professional education literature
available, there are likely any number of objective guidelines that school districts can and should follow
without running afoul of either parents or the law.
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should not assume so either.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the authorities who declared the doctrine dead in the
1980s, in loco parentis remains alive and well, explicitly in student
search cases and implicitly in student speech cases. The Supreme Court
led this revival and has given little regard to the doctrine's irrelevance to
contemporary public education. As the aphorism goes, "bad facts make
bad law." And the revival of in loco parentis is mired in bad facts.
Millions of schoolchildren 'have gone through the public schools in the
past few decades, and hundreds of thousands of teachers and
administrators have been involve-d with those students. In the greater
scheme of things, relatively few disputes between schools and students
reach the courts, particularly appellate courts.
To reach such
"rapprochement," something· must be governing the student-school
relationships in some pre_dictable and noncontroversial fashion, some
normative standard that schools, students, and parents use to dispose of
these disputes.
Courts, however, have a difficult time deciding these disputes. When
push comes to shove, they rely on a magnified discretion for school
districts to know what is best for the educational mission of the schools.
This discretion is, in no small measure, dependent on the doctrine of in
loco parentis. Courts are unprepared to question school boards'
authority for reasons that seem obscure, unless viewed from that
perspective. Indeed, many cases are taken up on appeal, not because
there are no institutional norms but because the cases and their facts _a re
of such bizarre proportion that one wonders what the school board was
thinking in letting it get that far. Perhaps other school administrators are
thinking the same thing. Rather than regard these cases as outliers and
as evidence of other administrative problems in the school district,
courts are wont to be persuaded that these problems are so intractable
that they are outside their judicial capacity. Of course, there are courts
who invite that persuasion because it appeals to their sense that
management is always right. In doing so, these courts put their
imprimatur on these outliers and the outertnost boundaries of collective
institutional behavior, not based on any coherent standards but on some
loosely defined doctrine that allows courts to throw up their collective
hands and say, "We don't understand how to run schools so we won't
144
interfere, regardless of what we really think."
This laissez-faire_

144.

See~

e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
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judicial attitude invites other school districts to follow suit rather than
maintain objective, professional norms. To the extent that in loco
parentis is at the root of these problems, it should be put to death,
quickly ,and now.

,

822, 838 (2002) ("In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its
wisdom,. Rather, we hold ,only that [the suspicionless drug-testing] Policy is a reasonable, means of
furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its
schoolchildren." (emphasis added)).

